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LEGISLATION-SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL AND TORT 
AsPECTS OF SHOPLIFTING STATUTEs-Shoplifting1 not only results 
in heavy financial losses for the merchant2 but also poses special 
problems in criminal law and general law enforcement.3 One such 
problem arises from the fact that most such thefts involve relative-
ly small amounts, with the result that the public does not seem 
extremely concerned about the matter when an individual case 
comes up for prosecution. Another peculiar difficulty is that per-
haps more than any other single crime shoplifting is an offense 
committed by amateurs, both adult and juvenile.4 This serves to 
make both detection and prosecution difficult. Finally, the right 
of the individual to be free from unlawful or unreasonable inter-
ference with his person or property> is more directly involved in 
this area of criminal law enforcement than in most others. 
Merchants have done much on their own in order to decrease 
shoplifting losses. Retail associations have disseminated informa-
tion with regard to the best methods to be used in preventing and 
discouraging pilferage.° Closed circuit television has been effec-
tive as a means of identifying and apprehending shoplifters.7 Pri-
vate detectives vested with police authority may be a potent weapon 
in the protection of their employers' property.8 And with the 
passage of new shoplifting legislation the merchants have initiated 
1 Shoplifting, broadly defined, is larceny or theft of goods or merchandise displayed 
for sale in a store. Employee pilferage and shopper victimization will not be discussed in 
this comment. 
2 See the statutory preamble to the new Florida shoplifting legislation, 22 Fla. Stat. 
Ann. (1944; Supp. 1958) §811.022, which estimates an annual $4,500,000 loss in Florida 
alone; and N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1954, p. 30:1, which estimates a weekly loss of $100,000 
in thefts from New York City stores. These losses generally are borne by the honest 
customer. 
s F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, Vol. XXV, No. 2, p. 108, Table 37 (1954) reports 
an increase in known shoplifting offenses of 11.4% from 1953 to 1954. Vol. XXVI, No. 2, 
p. 109, Table 37 (1955) reports a 4.4% increase from 1954 to 1955. 
4 See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1957, p. 24:2, reporting that police blamed a high 
school student shoplifting fad for a large part of a loss totalling $100,000 in a Sharon, 
Pennsylvania shopping center. The new Ohio shoplifting legislation [Ohio Rev. Code 
(Baldwin, 1958) §2935.041] provides merchants with special privileges for dealing with 
juvenile offenders. See comment, 62 YALE L.J. 788 at 790 (1953); note, 32 IND. L.J. 20 at 
28-33 (1956). 
5 See, generally, Seavy, "Principles of Torts," 56 HARV. L. REv. 72 (1942); ToRTS RE-
STATEMENT SECOND, Tentative Draft No. I, §120A, comment a (1957). The Michigan 
Legislative Committee on Shoplifting has concluded that all doubts should be resolved 
in favor of the privacy and rights of citizens: 69th Mich. Leg. (Reg. Sess. 1958) No. 23, 
p. 249 at 250. 
6 E.g., National Retail Merchants Association, Store Management Group pamphlet 
entitled "Watch Out for That Thief," on file in the Michigan Law Review office. 
7N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 7, 1956, §3, p. 1:4. Large convex mirrors appropriately placed 
throughout stores may be just as effective; N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1957, p. 23:6. 
a See note, 32 IND. L.J. 20 at 26 (1956). 
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publicity campaigns aimed at forewarning and thereby frightening 
off the would-be thief. But the expense of such "self-help" pro-
grams makes them available only to large merchants. And, perhaps 
more important, these measures do little to remove or lessen that 
which probably more than any other factor deters a merchant from 
taking action against pilferage: the fear that he will be liable in 
damages if he apprehends a suspected shoplifter who is later proved 
innocent. 
I. DOCTRINES APPLIED APART FROM THE NEW SHOPLIFTING 
LEGISLATION9 
At common law, a property owner could use reasonable force 
to defend10 or recapture11 his property only if he was correct in 
believing that an interference with his property was threatened by 
the party against whom he acted. If an innocent person was ac-
costed, detained, questioned or searched, the merchant was gen-
erally civilly liable for his wrongful conduct. This liability might 
be imposed in actions of false imprisonment,12 false arrest,13 assault 
and battery,14 malicious prosecution,15 slander16 or even insult 
and outrage.17 
The merchant's position at common law was made still more 
difficult by the fact that in most jurisdictions an arrest by a private 
individual without a warrant,18 for an alleged misdemeanor, even 
if committed in his presence, was illegal unless the misdemeanor 
constituted a breach of the public peace.19 An illegal arrest sub-
9 See, generally, Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 541, 673 and 
798 (1924); comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 887 (1952), cont. in 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 82 (1952); 
comment, 62 YALE L.J. 788 (1953). 
10 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., p. 92 (1955); 1 TORTS REsrATEMENT §77 (1934). 
11 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., p. 100 (1955); 1 TORTS RESTATEMENT §§100-106 (1934). 
_ 12 E.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S.W. (2d) 759 (1940). 
13 E.g., Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W. (2d) 
638 (1944). See 21 A.L.R. (2d) 643 (1952). 
14 E.g., Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 1 S. (2d) 510 (1941). 
15 E.g., Grove v. Purity Stores, 153 Cal. App. (2d) 23_4, 314 P. (2d) 543 (1957). 
16 E.g., Camp v. Maddox, 93 Ga. App. 646, 92 S.E. (2d) 581 (1956). 
17 No merchant has been held liable for insulting language alone, but where such 
language is combined with other wrongful acts recovery has been allowed on a theory of 
tortious misconduct toward an invitee. Mansour v. Mobley, 96 Ga. App. 812, 101 S.E. 
(2d) 786 (1957). With regard to the tort of insulting or abusive language, see, generally, 
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956); 15 A.L.R. (2d) 108 (1951). 
18 Arrest without a warrant may be defined as an " .•• apprehension without any 
special authorization but merely under a general authority which the officer or private 
person has (or thinks he has) under the circumstances." Perkins, "The Law of Arrest," 
25 IowA L. REv. 201 at 229 (1940). For a definition of arrest, see Wilgus, "Arrest Without 
a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 541 at 543 (1924). 
19 However, a private person may arrest for a felony committed within his presence, 
or a felony committed outside his presence if it was in fact committed and he has reason-
1960] COMMENTS 431 
jected the arresting party to civil liability regardless of the guilt of 
the party accused. Although many jurisdictions have by statute 
broadened the arrest powers of both peace officers20 and private 
persons, 21 few states have enabled a merchant to arrest suspected 
shoplifters without the fear of liability for a mistake either in 
identity or the fact of commission.22 In addition, the effectiveness 
of legislation broadening the arrest power of private individuals 
has often been limited by judicial interpretation, since the statutes 
are in derogation of common law rules.23 Legislation broadening 
the power of police officers to arrest without a warrant in cases of 
misdemeanors, enacted in most states,24 is basically ineffective in 
able grounds for believing the person arrested committed it. The common law rules are 
discussed in Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 673 (1924). The 
classification of a theft from a store as a felony or misdemeanor depends on the value of 
the merchandise taken. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. (1953) §76-38-5, providing that if the 
value of the property is less than $50, theft is a misdemeanor. With this approach the 
usual shoplifting theft is a misdemeanor. But see 3 Alaska Comp. Laws (1949) §65-5-42 
and 3 Alaska Comp. Laws (Cum. Supp. 1958) §65-2-2, and Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 
§750.360, classifying shoplifting as a felony. Several states make all larcenies felonies. E.g., 
7 Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) §39-4204. 
20 Peace officer is defined in Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 
541 at 561-562 (1924). See also Doherty v. Lester, 4 Misc. (2d) 741, 159 N.Y .S. (2d) 219 
(1957), finding that a private detective is not a peace officer; Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 
Wash. (2d) 649, 314 P. (2d) 414 (1957), finding that a deputized store detective had officer's 
arrest powers. 
21 See Appendix II for a state-by-state classification of the arrest powers of both peace 
officers and private citizens, before and after recent shoplifting legislation. 
22 But see Wyo. Stat. (1957) §7-156 and Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; re-issue 1956) §29-402, 
which allow private persons to arrest without warrants where "petit larceny has been 
committed" and the arresting person has "reasonable grounds to believe the person arrested 
is guilty." Texas expressly allows a merchant to arrest without a warrant in order to 
prevent the consequences of a theft. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (Vernon, 1954) §§212, 
325. Section 325 has been held to give store employees the power to arrest a suspected 
pickpocket; Lasker v. State, 163 Tex. Cr. 337, 290 S.W. (2d) 901 (1956). 
23 E.g., the statutory "presence" requirement is often restrictively interpreted. See 
Alsup v. Skaggs Drug Center, 203 Okla. 525, 223 P. (2d) 530 (1949). See State v. Pluth, 
157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789 (1923), and Smith v. Hubbard, (Minn. 1958) 91 N.W. (2d) 
756 for what is necessary to meet such a "presence" requirement. 
24 Most states by statute allow an officer to arrest without a warrant where the offense 
is committed in his presence. See Appendix II for a state-by-state classification. Several 
states go farther and permit such arrests where the officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe the person committed a misdemeanor and the misdemeanor has in fact been 
committed. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1957) §39-2-20. Iowa and Illinois 
have similar statutes. III. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 38, §657; Iowa Code (1958) §755.4. Officers 
in Michigan possess the same power because shoplifting is classified as a felony. Mich. 
Comp. Laws (1948) §764.15. In Wisconsin the officer may arrest without a warrant if he 
has reasonable grounds to believe a misdemeanor has been committed and the arrest is 
necessary to prevent the consequences. Wis. Stat. (1958) §954.03. Hawaii allows an officer 
to arrest and detain on a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or intends 
to commit an offense. Hawaii Rev. Laws (1955) §§255.3-255.4. R.I. Gen. Laws (1956) 
§12-7-3 (c) is similar. In Texas, officers, like private persons, may arrest to prevent the 
consequences of a theft. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (Vernon, 1954) §§212, 325. In Wil-
liams v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. 439, 236 S.W. (2d) 136 (1951), an officer was allowed to arrest 
a suspected misdemeanant under §325. 
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dealing with suspected shoplifters primarily because the officer is 
rarely present when the pilfering is committed or attempted. 
Moreover, like statutes broadening the arrest power of private 
citizens, legislation doing the same for peace officers has been re-
strictively interpreted.25 
A number of states, apart from recent shoplifting statutes, have 
tried to give storekeepers some protection by recognizing "prob-
able cause or reasonable grounds to suspect the commission of a 
theft" as a mitigating circumstance to be used to reduce exemplary 
and punitive damages in civil actions brought by persons unlaw-
fully detained or arrested.26 Some jurisdictions have gone farther 
and judicially recognized "probable cause" as a complete defense 
in cases which would otherwise have been unlawful detention of 
a suspected shoplifter by a merchant.27 However, this defense gen-
erally has been extended only to short detentions for the purpose 
of investigation and has not been available in actions for false 
arrest.28 
II. RECENT SHOPLIFTING LEGISLATION 
Statutory broadening of arrest powers and judicial develop-
ment of defenses for the merchant were not sufficient to cope fully 
with the unique problems of shoplifting. Legislation of various 
types, all dealing specifically with the shoplifting problem, has been 
enacted by thirty-seven states.29 Twenty-three states have new 
criminal legislation. Twelve states have enlarged the power of 
peace officers to arrest without a warrant where suspected shop-
25 See note 23 supra. The officer's arrest power may be further limited if he delays 
in making the arrest. See 58 A.L.R. (2d) 1056 (1958). And he can use only a limited 
amount of force in arresting a suspected misdemeanant. See 3 A.L.R. II70 (1919) and 
42 A.L.R. 1200 (1926); Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 798 at 
814-815 (1924). 
26 See 137 A.L.R. 504 (1942) and 49 A.L.R. (2d) 1460 (1956). For an extended dis-
cussion of the judicial doctrine of probable cause in cases of unlawful detention, see 
comment, 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 82 (1952). 
27 Collyer v. S. H. Kress &: Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936); Montgomery 
Ward v. Freeman, (4th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 720. TORTS REsTATEMENT SECOND, Tentative 
Draft No. I, §120A (1957). In Teel v. May Dept. Stores, 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W. (2d) 74 
.(1941), an instruction on probable cause was allowed in an action for false imprisonment, 
but this may be due to the fact the actions of the plaintiff included false personation, 
a felony. See also Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943) 
(merchant's detention clearly unreasonable); S. H. Kress &: Co. v. Bradshaw, 186 Okla. 588, 
99 P. (2d) 508 (1940) (plaintiff unaware of any detention during the investigative period) . 
.But see Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S.W. (2d) 759 (1940). 
28 E.g., Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 50 S.E. (2d) 387 (1948); 
Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W. (2d) 638 (1944). 
See TORTS REsTATEMENT SECOND, Tentative Draft No. 1, §120A, comment d (1957). 
29 All statutory citations may be found in Appendix I. Throughout the text the 
statutes will be referred to only by state of enactment. 
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lifters are involved, and one of these has broadened the arrest 
power of its private citizens. Twenty-eight states have created 
statutory privileges for the merchant who seeks to apprehend sus-
pected shoplifters. 
In discussing the new statutes, their possible interpretation, 
practical application and effectiveness will be considered. In the 
discussion which follows, it will be assumed that the typical shoplift-
ing situation involves an actual or suspected misdemeanor. Ref-
erences to either officers' or citizens' arrest powers will be to arrests 
without warrants for misdemeanors. 
A. Criminal Provisions 
Prior to the adoption of the new statutes shoplifting was gen-
erally prosecuted under larceny statutes.30 Because the elements 
needed to prove larceny do not coincide with the evidence often 
available in shoplifting cases, convictions were difficult to obtain.31 
For example, unless a witness saw the taking and subsequent de-
parture from the premises without payment for the goods, it was 
hard to prove the essential element of an intent to deprive the 
owner of his property or to appropriate the property to the taker's 
own use. In an attempt to facilitate criminal prosecutions, some 
of the new statutes provide that certain specific acts shall constitute 
the crime of shoplifting. Statutory presumptions which shift to 
the defendant the burden of producing evidence have been created. 
Finally, stronger penalties which increase in severity with the com-
mission of subsequent offenses have been imposed. 
Georgia and West Virginia have defined four distinct acts, any 
one of which constitutes the crime of shoplifting: 
". . . wilfully to take possession of any merchandise offered 
for sale by any store with the intention of converting the same 
to the use of such person without paying to the owner the 
value thereof." 
". . . wilfully to conceal upon his person or otherwise any 
merchandise offered for sale by any store with the intention 
of converting the same to the use of such person without pay-
ing to the owner the value thereof." 
" ... wilfully to alter any label, price tag or marking upon any 
merchandise offered for sale by any store with the intention of 
depriving the mvner of all or some part of the value thereof." 
so E.g., N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §§1290 (defining larceny) and 1298 
(defining petit larceny). 
31 See, generally, note, 32 IND. L.J. 20 (1956). 
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" ... wilfully to transfer any merchandise offered for sale by 
any store from the container in or on which the same shall be 
displayed to any other container with intent to deprive the 
owner of all or some part of the value thereof."32 
Several other states have framed criminal legislation in terms of 
more than one distinct act,33 but the majority have adopted a 
single standard of criminal conduct, enacting either the "take 
possession without payment" or "willful concealment" type stat-
utes. 34 · 
On their face, the "take possession without payment" statutes 
seem to encounter the same difficult proof problems encountered 
under the broader larceny statutes. These statutes all continue to 
require proof of an intent to convert. To prove such intent, the 
merchant might have to allow the thief to leave the premises, or 
at least go beyond the check-out counter, thereby affording the 
suspect a means of escape. Moreover, it will not be difficult for 
the suspect, often an amateur with no past criminal record, to con-
vince the jury that he simply forgot to pay for the goods. Since 
the prosecution must prove the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the "forgot to pay" defense will probably be 
quite successful. For this reason nine states have enacted statutory 
presumptions to the effect that a willful concealment of goods is 
sufficient to create a presumption of the necessary intent to con-
vert.35 Similarly, some of these also provide that the finding of 
goods concealed upon a person or among his belongings, or upon 
the person or among the belongings of another, is prima facie 
evidence of willful concealment.36 These statutory presumptions 
are not likely to create constitutional problems37 and should aid 
32 W. Va. Code (Supp. 1959) §5990 (8). 
33 Texas defines shoplifting as the removal of goods from their place with an intent 
to take and deprive the owner of value, or the altering of labels or shifting of containers 
with intent to defraud. Oregon and Rhode Island define shoplifting in terms of both 
willful concealment and taking possession without payment, requiring an intent to convert 
under either test. 
34 See the classification in Appendix Ill. The Indiana statute is similar to the "take 
possession without payment" statutes, defining shoplifting as taking, stealing or carrying 
away merchandise with a felonious intent. 
35 Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee and West Virginia. 
36 Arkansas, Connecticut, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota 
and Tennessee. These statutes create evidentiary rules stating that the ultimate fact (in-
tent to convert to own use) will be inferred from some other fact (concealment of goods) 
until evidence to the contrary is produced. See 4 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1356, p. 724 
(1940). 
37 In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the Court at 467 states: " ... a 
statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the 
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in the apprehension and prosecution of shoplifters by allowing 
the merchant to approach the shoplifter before he leaves the 
premises. 
Potentially, the most effective criminal provision is the "willful 
concealment" type of legislation. Although the West Virginia law 
quoted above requires the showing of an intent to convert as part 
of its willful concealment provision, several other statutes merely 
provide that the willful concealment of goods without authority 
while on the premises is sufficient to constitute the crime. 38 In 
those states with no statutory intent requirement, prosecution is 
facilitated by the fact that an offender can be accosted on the prem-
ises, and also by the use of statutory presumptions which provide 
that goods found concealed upon the person constitute prima fade 
evidence of willful concealment.39 
Only two states expressly provide that the crime of shoplifting 
shall be limited to the theft of goods under a certain dollar value. 
In one case the stated value is $50,40 in the other $75.41 The states 
which have criminal legislation and do not so provide may face a 
somewhat peculiar difficulty arising from the fact that the more 
specific shoplifting provision may be held to bar any prosecution 
under the general larceny statutes. It would be possible for a court 
to use this argument to hold that a person who "shoplifted" an 
article of great value could not be prosecuted for grand larceny, a 
felony, but must be prosecuted for shoplifting, a misdemeanor:12 
Such a holding, however, would clearly not be in line with the 
policy underlying the enactment of the new criminal provision:13 
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from the proof of 
the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience." 
Shoplifting legislation of the type under discussion should have no difficulty under this test. 
38 Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia. 
39 Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire and North Carolina use such presumptions. 
40Texas. 
41 Washington. 
42 See, e.g., State v. Richman, 347 Mo. 595, 148 S.W. (2d) 796 (1941), holding that 
enactment of a statute making the drawing of a check with insufficient funds to cover it a 
misdemeanor operated to withdraw that conduct from the operation of a statute making 
obtaining money under false pretenses a felony. Accord: State v. Beck.er, 39 Wash. (2d) 
94, 234 P. (2d) 897 (1951); People v. Breyer, 139 Cal. App. 547, 34 P. (2d) 1065 (1934). 
Cf. Price v. United States, (5th Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 120. See, generally, 2 SUTHERLAND, 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3d ed., §5204 (1943). 
43 Georgia and West Virginia have avoided this difficulty by providing that if the 
value of the stolen goods exceeds $50 the crime shall be punished as a felony. Kansas pro-
vides that the crime shall be punished as a felony if the value of the goods exceeds $50 or 
was the subject of grand larceny. 
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Statutory penalties for the new crime of shoplifting correspond 
to those for petit larceny in many states.44 A few states have pro-
vided varying penalties according to the value of the goods taken.'15 
Some states have place~ heavier sanctions on subsequent offenses,46 
and most of these make a third offense punishable by imprisonment 
in a state penitentiary for a year or more.47 The Oregon statute, 
which allows a maximum punishment of seven years for any of-
fense, is unusual in its severity and will probably not be utilized 
by the Oregon courts to the extent permissible.' 
While the new criminal provisions may be of some value in 
gaining convictions,48 they could not be really effective unless 
some steps were taken to make it less difficult to apprehend &us-
pected shoplifters. A ware of this, legislatures have made the new 
criminal provisions one part of the overall attack. As the other 
parts of the new approach, the states have generally done either or 
both of the following to facilitate the apprehension of offenders: 
broadened arrest powers of individuals and police officers, and 
created statutory privileges in order to lessen the potential civil 
liability of merchants who mistakenly detain or accost innocent 
persons. 
B. Broadening of Arrest Powers 
Several states, as part of the current wave of legislation, have 
broadened the arrest powers of police officers by permitting them 
to make arrests without warrants where there is reasonable ground 
or probable cause to believe that the crime of shoplifting has been 
44 The Maine statute, which provides for a fine of not more than $100, or imprisonment 
for not more than six months, or both, is fairly typical of the statutes which do not provide 
progressive penalties for subsequent offenses. 
45 See the discussion of the Georgia, Kansas and West Virginia statutes in note 43 supra. 
46 Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas. Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 38, §393, which 
creates progressive penalties for subsequent offenses of larceny. 
47 Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee 
and Texas provide that a third offense shall be punishable by one to five years imprison-
ment. New Mexico makes a third offense punishable by imprisonment for three to five 
years. Indiana is the most severe, providing for disenfranchisement and imprisonment for 
two to ten years. 
48 The Pennsylvania statute contains a unique provision calling for conviction for the 
crime of shoplifting in a "summary proceeding." This aspect of the Pennsylvania statute 
is severely criticized on the ground that it violates constitutional jury trial guarantees in 
comment, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 445 (1959). 
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committed49 or attempted,150 even though not in the officer's pres-
ence. Three statutes require that a charge of shoplifting be placed 
against a suspect before the officer may arrest, 51 while three other 
statutes combine this approach with the more generally used rea-
sonable ground test by providing that such a charge by a merchant 
constitutes a reasonable ground upon which the officer can arrest.52 
Unless some such specific standard of reasonable grounds is stated in 
the statute, the judiciary will have to establish a reasonable grounds 
formula. This will probably be in the form of the test now gen-
erally used in felony cases where officers arrest without warrants, 
namely, whether a reasonable and prudent man, possessed with 
the knowledge possessed by the officer, could reasonably believe that 
the party to be apprehended has committed or attempted to commit 
the particular crime.53 It will also be the courts' task to determine 
what other limitations are to be placed on the new statutory 
powers. For example, it seems likely that the courts will place the 
same general reasonable force and time limitations on the new 
statutory arrest powers as are placed on similar common law 
powers.54 
West Virginia is the only jurisdiction which has broadened 
the arrest powers of the private individual as a part of its anti-
shoplifting legislation. This was done by making shoplifting a 
breach of the peace, thereby allowing the merchant to arrest if the 
crime is committed in his presence. However, the fact that most 
jurisdictions have not broadened the arrest powers of the private 
individual along with those of police officers does not mean the 
49 Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee 
and Utah require a reasonable belief that the crime has been committed. See also the 
West Virginia statute, which makes shoplifting a breach of the peace. 
50 Arizona, Minnesota and Washington give the officer broadened arrest powers where 
he reasonably believes the person has committed or attempted to commit the crime of 
shoplifting. 
51 Arizona, Minnesota and Washington. 
52 Louisiana, New Mexico and Utah. Under the Utah statute such a charge may not 
be made by a minor. 
53 People v. La Bostrie, 14 m. (2d) 617, 153 N.E. (2d) 570 (1958). See also Christ v. 
McDonald, 152 Ore. 494, 52 P. (2d) 655 (1935). In an action for false arrest the defendant 
must justify the arrest. Harrer v. Montgomery Ward&: Co., 124 Mont. 295, 221 P. (2d) 
428 (1950). Where the facts are not in dispute the question of probable cause is for the 
court. Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, 158 N.W. 182 (1916). Cf. Gibson v. J. C. 
Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. (2d) 640, 331 P. (2d) 1057 (1958). 
54 See, generally, Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 798 at 814-815 
(1924). Two statutes expressly provide such limitations. Under the Ohio statute the officer 
can exercise his newly-created power only within a reasonable time after the unlawful 
taking has been committed. The New Mexico statute allows the officer to arrest off the 
merchant's premises only in the event he is in pursuit. 
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new arrest provisions are of no direct benefit to the merchants. 
Where an officer makes an unlawful arrest at the instigation of a 
merchant, the merchant can be held liable as an instigator of or 
participant in the unlawful action.65 One defense to such an action 
is that the acts involved were not a sufficient participation in the 
unlawful arrest to form a basis for liability. Thus, for example, a 
merchant cannot be held liable if he merely gives information to 
the arresting officer, accompanies the officer during the investiga-
tion, or identifies a suspect.66 But a surer defense is to show that 
the arrest was lawful in itself. The new statutes, by broadening the 
arrest powers of officers, will therefore directly benefit the mer-
chants by narrowing their possible liability for participation m 
unlawful arrests. 
C. Privileged Conduct and Statutory Defenses Under the 
New Legislation 
The third and most important prong in the current multi-
pronged attack on shoplifting is the enactment of statutory privi-
leges and defenses which will henceforth be available to mer-
chants in civil actions arising out of their efforts to detain suspected 
shoplifters.67 The statutory broadening of arrest powers, to the 
extent that it operates as a defense in damage actions, is this type of 
legislation. Beyond this, the failure of the common law privileges 
with regard to the defense and recapture of property sufficiently to 
protect the merchants58 has brought on further legislative change. 
This change has taken the form of statutory privileges which may 
be exercised without fear of civil liability. 
55 See, e.g., Alsup v. Skaggs Drug Center, 203 Okla. 525, 223 P. (2d) 530 (1949), holding 
a store liable for instigation of an unlawful arrest. See, generally, 21 A.L.R. (2d) 643 (1952); 
PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., p. 51 (1955). 
56 See, e.g., Edgar v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 166 Neb. 452, 89 N.W. (2d) 238 (1958); 
Check.eye v. John Bettendork Market, (St. Louis Mo. Ct. App. 1953) 257 S.W. (2d) 202; 
Simpson v. Burton, 328 Mich. 557, 44 N.W. (2d) 178 (1950). 
57 Most of the statutes also provide that a person exercising a statutory privilege will 
not be held criminally liable therefor. E.g., the Alabama statute provides that the merchant 
exercising the privilege "shall not be criminally or civilly liable for false arrest or false 
imprisonment .••• " 
58 This failure may be partially traced to the fact that if a court is able to find that 
the merchant has in fact arrested the plaintiff, it can hold the plaintiff for making an 
unlawful arrest without regard to doctrines of defense and recapture of property. See 
comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 887 at 894-899 (1952), for a discussion of this problem. Some 
courts have also been quick to find the detention on which a false arrest claim can be 
based. See, e.g., Ashland Dry Goods v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577, 195 S.W. (2d) 312 (1946), hold-
ing that retention of a customer's purse along with a statement that she could not leave 
until.a package was wrapped was sufficient evidence from which to find a detention. See 
also Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943). For a contrary 
approach, see Swetnam v. F. W. Woolworth &: Co., 83 Ariz. 189, 318 P. (2d) 364 (1957). 
1960] COMMENTS 439 
These provisions raise a host of questions. First, what type of 
conduct is covered by the statutory language? Second, under what 
circumstances may the privileges be exercised? Third, what types 
of limitations, statutory or otherwise, will be used to qualify the 
privileges? Fourth, what persons are entitled to exercise the 
privileges? Finally, what is the effect of a judicial determination 
that the conduct of the merchant is the kind of conduct deemed 
privileged by the statute? These questions should be considered 
in two different ways: first, with regard to the characteristics com-
mon to all or most of the statutes, and second, with a view to the 
variations among them. 
Nineteen of the twenty-eight states which have legislatively 
granted new privileges to storekeepers have done so by allowing 
the detention of suspected thieves under certain circumstances.159 
Because this "right to detain" type of legislation is by far the most 
common, the discussion to follow will be with regard to statutes of 
this type, although much that is said may be equally applicable to 
all the new legislation purporting to lessen the potential civil 
liability of merchants. Legislation granting privileges to mer-
chants in terms other than a "right to detain" will be specifically 
discussed at a later point. 
(1) Statutes Giving Merchants a Right To Detain Suspects. 
Five states legislatively recognizing a right to detain have done so 
in identical or nearly identical language, which reads as foll,ows: 
(1) "A peace officer, or a merchant, or a merchant's employee 
who has probable cause for believing that goods held for 
sale by the merchant have been unlawfully taken by a 
person and that he can recover them by taking the person 
into custody, may, for the purpose of attempting to effect 
such recovery, take the person into custody and detain 
him in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of 
time. Such taking into custody and detention by a police 
officer, merchant, or merchant's employee shall not ren-
der such police officer, merchant or merchant's employee 
criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprison-
ment, or unlawful detention." 
(3) "A merchant or merchant's employee who causes such 
arrest as provided for in subsection (1) of a person for 
larceny of goods held for sale shall not be criminally or r 
civilly liable for false arrest or false imprisonment where 
the merchant or merchant's employee has probable cause ' 
159 A state-by-state classification may be found in Appendix m. 
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for believing that the person arrested committed larceny 
of goods held for sale."60 
Other statutes of this type are variations of this. 
Because of the dangers to personal freedom inherent in any 
legislation validating certain types of · detention, a requirement 
that such detention be only for a particular purpose is necessary in 
order to sanction the invasion of individual liberties only where 
the problem to be remedied so demands.61 A number of states 
have adopted a purpose requirement similar to that in the Ala-
bama statute, quoted above: a merchant may detain in order to 
"attempt to effect a recovery."62 A slight variation of this, which 
may permit the use of somewhat more physical force, is "to effect 
a recovery."63 Since goods could be recovered by turning the 
suspect over to an officer as well as by direct recapture by the 
merchant, the privilege to some extent also encompasses detention 
in order to deliver to police authorities. But suppose that upon 
being accosted the suspected thief surrenders the goods and tries 
to run. May the merchant, knowing the suspect no longer has the 
goods, detain him for the purpose of delivering him to the police? 
A strict application of the statutory language would result in the 
denial of the privilege in such a case, and the merchant would 
have to rely upon the privileges accorded him by the common law. 
However, it seems unlikely that these statutes will be so inter-
preted, since most states, like Alabama, provide in a subsequent sec-
tion that anyone who causes an arrest as provided for in the prior 
section shall not be civilly liable therefor. While this might refer 
only to the party who takes a person into custody to recover the 
goods and incidentally causes his arrest, it can also be taken to 
mean that the privilege encompasses detention for the purpose of 
delivering to the proper authorities.64 
60 Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1957) tit. 14, §334. States with substantially identical provi-
sions are Florida, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Tennessee. 
61 Three statutes permitting detention contain no express purpose requirement. The 
Georgia statute, which allows a person to detain or arrest any person reasonably suspected 
of shoplifting, is the most difficult to deal with. The Oregon statute, which allows a 
merchant to detain and interrogate is likely to be interpreted as meaning detention for 
purposes of interrogation. The South Dakota statute, which allows detention until 
promptly notified police arrive, may be interpreted to mean detention for the purpose of 
calling in the police. 
62 In addition to the states mentioned in note 60 supra, this provision may be found 
in the statutes of Kentucky, New Mexico and Utah. 
63 Adopted in Arkansas and Pennsylvania. 
64 See also the Oklahoma statute, which permits a merchant to detain for the purpose 
of attempting a recovery, and at a later point expressly provides that the suspect may be 
detained until an officer can be summoned, thereby making it clear that in Oklahoma 
detention for purposes of recovery encompasses detention in order to summon the police. 
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A few statutes allow detention only for the purpose of causing 
an arrest, or of delivering to a peace officer and placing a charge 
against the offender.65 If any recovery is to be effected, it ap-
parently must be through the intervention of the police. Simi-
larly, it may be that the merchant will be given no privilege to 
interrogate unless an officer is present. In some states this type of 
privilege is indirectly broadened by provisions which allow police 
greater latitude in arresting without a warrant. However, privi-
leges of this type, which are clearly prosecution-oriented, 66 have 
an inherent weakness, since in many instances where a juvenile or 
amateur offender is involved the merchant may have no desire to 
prosecute. If he does not, he must choose between risking liability 
with only the common law privileges available in his defense, or 
allowing the goods to be taken. While putting the merchant to 
this choice can clearly be justified on the ground that prosecution 
is the desired end and a merchant who thinks otherwise should 
not be accorded a privilege, this argument seems unrealistic.67 
The rule most in accord with the realities of the situation is that 
which allows detention of a suspect either to try to recover the 
goods or to deliver the suspect to the police. One state has adopted 
such a provision.68 
Other jurisdictions have adopted less precise purpose require-
ments. These include detaining "to question," "to investigate," 
and "to investigate ownership of the goods."69 None of these 
seems to go so far as to justify the use of force to recover the goods, 
so that a merchant effecting such a recovery would have to depend 
on common law recapture doctrines. On the other hand, deten-
tion for purposes of investigation is somewhat broader than deten-
tion in order to deliver to the police, since it is not primarily 
prosecution-oriented, while at the same time it should be inter-
preted to permit detention for the purpose of calling in the police 
to aid with the investigation. 
65 Minnesota (in order to deliver to officer and make charge), New Mexico (in order 
to deliver to officer) and Ohio (in order to cause arrest). Virginia permits a merchant to 
cause an arrest without speaking in terms of detention. 
66 This is particularly true of the Minnesota and South Dakota statutes. Minnesota 
states that detention must be for the purpose of delivering to law authorities and placing 
a charge against the suspect; South Dakota provides that a merchant who is requested to 
sign a complaint and testify and fails to do so may not assert the statutory privilege. 
67 Ohio has recognized this difficulty by providing that where juveniles are involved 
the detention may be not only for the purpose of causing an arrest, but also in order to 
recover the stolen items or communicate with the parents of the offender. 
68 New Mexico. 
69 Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana and Massachusetts. The Oregon statute may be in-
terpreted to mean detention for the purpose of interrogation. See note 61 supra. The 
Mississippi statute allows a merchant to question, without mention of detention. 
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Once it has been decided that a merchant may detain for a 
particular purpose, legislatures must set forth the circumstances 
in which the merchant may exercise his privilege. Most of the 
statutes70 provide that the suspect may be detained only when the 
merchant has "probable cause" or "reasonable grounds" for hold-
ing a particular belief: the variation in statutory language occurs 
with regard to the type of belief which must be held. The most 
frequently used test is again found in the Alabama statute: the 
detaining actor must have "probable cause for believing that goods 
held for sale by the merchant have been unlawfully taken by a 
person and that he can recover them by taking the person into 
custody."71 The last part of this test is a natural complement to 
provisions allowing detention for the purpose of recovering goods. 
States allowing detention for other purposes have generally 
adopted the same test, absent the language concerning recovery 
of the goods.72 While the Alabama statute suggests that two in-
dependent "belief" tests must be met, this will probably not be 
the case. The courts should realize that while the statute does 
invite judicial consideration of such circumstances as physical size 
and the number of parties involved in order to determine whether 
there were reasonable grounds for believing that the goods could 
be recovered, it is always reasonable for a merchant to believe that 
the fact of detention will in itself result in recovery of the goods. 
With this realization, the second test embodied in the Alabama 
statute becomes relatively meaningless. 
A few states require. that the actor have reasonable grounds for 
believing that the newly-defined crime of shoplifting has been 
committed.73 Where this is combined with a provision that will-
ful concealment either constitutes or is prima facie evidence of 
the new crime,74 a shopkeeper should be allowed to detain when-
ever he sees willful concealment or has reasonable grounds to be-
70 Only the Arkansas and Pennsylvania statutes contain no such express requirement, 
both simply providing that shoplifters "may be detained." It is likely, however, that the 
requirement will be implied. See Cohen v. Lit Bros., 166 Pa. Super. 206, 70 A. (2d) 419 
(1950). 
71Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1957) tit. 14, §334(1). Substantially the same provision 
has been enacted in Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Tennessee. 
72 Illinois and Minnesota require a reasonable belief that the suspect has wrongfully 
taken or is wrongfully taking. New Mexico, Ohio and Utah require a reasonable belief 
that the suspect has wrongfully taken. 
73 Georgia, Kansas and Oregon. Louisiana's statute is analogous, requiring a belief 
that theft has been committed. Similarly, the Massachusetts statute requires reasonable 
grounds for believing that the detained person was committing or attempting to commit 
larceny of goods held for sale. 
74 Both Georgia and Oregon provide that the fact of willful concealment shall 
constitute the crime of shoplifting. 
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lieve such concealment has taken place. However, the advisability 
of making the privilege exercisable only on a belief that the 
elements of a statutory crime are present may not be wise, since 
the technical elements of the crime may not be generally known. 
An objective standard will be used to determine whether or 
not the merchant had reasonable grounds or probable cause for 
his belief,75 this being a question of law for the court to decide76 
with the jury being used to determine disputes in the facts on 
which the resolution of that question depends.77 
With the exception of Louisiana and Minnesota, all the 
statutes giving a merchant some privilege to detain add the 
proviso that the detention must be "in a reasonable manner and 
for a reasonable length of time." The reasonable manner limita-
tion encompasses a number of elements. First, whether or not a 
given manner of detention is reasonable may turn on whether it is 
a manner well adapted to carry out the privilege.78 For example, 
a detention which is made unnecessarily public may be unreason-
able. Similarly, detention and interrogation carried on in an in-
sulting and humiliating way may be unreasonable when it could 
have been done equally well in a courteous manner.79 Second, ap-
plication of the reasonable manner requirement should include 
an examination of the place of detention. Third, the requirement 
incorporates a test of reasonable force.80 Several factors may be of 
75 Cf. Brodie v. Huck, 187 Va. 485, 47 S.E. (2d) 310 (1948), a malicious prosecution 
case stating that in order to find probable cause the prosecutor must believe in the guilt 
of the accused and that that belief must be reasonable. In the case of the new shoplifting 
statutes, an honest and strong belief that the prohibited act has occurred should suffice 
as long as the existing circumstances would lead a reasonable and prudent man to the 
same conclusion. This test is expressly set out in the Georgia statute. 
70 Roberson v. J. C. Penney Co., 136 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 288 P. (2d) 275 (1955); Collyer 
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936). Cf. Crim v. Crim, 39 Ala. App. 
413, 101 S. (2d) 845 (1958), suggesting that probable cause as a justification in a malicious 
prosecution case is a question of law because of the danger that the jury, when faced with 
the fact of the individual's defamation, may overlook the justifiable and commendable 
acts of citizens who have grounds for believing that a serious breach of social conduct has 
occurred. See note, 3 U.C.L.A. L. R.Ev. 269 (1956). 
77 Roberson v. J. C. Penney Co., 136 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 288 P. (2d) 275 (1955), note, 3 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 269 (1956); Cohen v. Lit Bros., 166 Pa. Super. 206, 70 A. (2d) 419 (1950). 
Cf. Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 99 S.E. (2d) 384 (1957) (malicious prosecu-
tion case), 
78 See Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936), holding that 
a detention for purposes of investigation was reasonable although the compulsion used was 
threat of arrest and the plaintiff was asked to restore the property, since the court felt 
this was the only way defendant could protect his property. See also Teel v. May Depart-
ment Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696 at 706-707, 155 S.W. (2d) 74 (1941). 
79 See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., p. 105 (1955). 
so Both the Minnesota and Louisiana statutes, which contain no reasonable manner 
limitations, contain express provisions for the use of no more than reasonable force. The 
Minnesota statute further requires that the suspect be promptly informed of the purpose 
of the detention and that he not be questioned against his will. 
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importance with regard to the use of force. It may be that the 
courts will adopt some established test by analogy to common law 
privilege doctrines.81 For example, it may be that force will be 
held reasonable up to the point where a breach of the peace 
occurs or serious bodily harm is inflicted.82 On the other hand, 
it may be that the question will simply turn on the facts of each 
case. Another factor will be the extent to which the privilege itself 
envisions the use of force. The right to detain in order to effect 
a recovery may implicitly permit the use of more force than the 
right to detain to "attempt" to effect a recovery. The right to 
detain to investigate may not implicitly permit as much force as 
that where recovery is the purpose. Finally, the reasonable man-
ner limitation must to some extent depend on the peculiar cir-
cumstances of each case: the age and sex of the suspect, the value 
of the goods thought stolen, etc. The question of reasonable man-
ner, as well as reasonable time, is for the jury.83 
What constitutes a reasonable length of time will depend on 
the particular facts and the privilege involved. If the statute 
allows detention in order to deliver to a peace officer, reasonable 
time must be at least the time required to get an officer on the 
scene. Common law authority on this question will undoubtedly 
be used as precedent.84 Two states expressly provide that deten-
tion shall not exceed one hour, although a reasonable time may be 
less than one hour.85 
Some statutes provide express limitations on the exercise of the 
privilege other than reasonable manner and time. Three states 
provide that the detention must take place on or in the immediate 
vicinity of the merchant's premises, a requirement which may be 
read into the reasonable manner limitation anyway.86 Louisiana 
81 See comment, 24 TENN. L. REv. 1177 at 1182 (1957). 
82 E.g., the degree of force deemed reasonable in order to recapture personal property 
is force reasonably necessary and not intended to cause death or serious bodily harm. 1 
TORTS REsrATEMENT §106 (1934). This same test is embodied in the Wisconsin statute, 
discussed at note 103 infra. 
83 See, e.g., Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943) 
(reasonableness of investigation is for the jury); Curlee v. Scales, 200 N.C. 612, 158 S.E. 89 
(1931) (where privilege to protect property was asserted in assault and battery case, the 
question of excessive force was for the jury). 
84 See, e.g., Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936) (twenty-
minute detention reasonable); Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 430, 54 P. (2d) 
24 (1936) (detention of slightly less than fifteen minutes reasonable). See also TORTS RE-
srATEMENT SECOND, Tentative Draft No. 1, §120A, comment f (1957) ("Fifteen minutes 
may be too long where all that is necessary is to ask a clerk whether the other has paid."). 
85 Louisiana and New Mexico. 
86 Kansas, Massachusetts and Ohio. The American Law Institute has refused to ex-
press any opinion as to whether "reasonable manner" as used in the merchant protection 
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requires that the detention must be on the premises. Ohio pro-
vides that the privilege cannot be exercised until the suspect has 
left the premises. This latter limitation seems too severe, for it 
eliminates one of the basic values of the detention type statute, the 
ability of the merchant to act before the suspect leaves the store.87 
The statutes vary somewhat with regard to who can exercise 
the privilege to detain. In general, however, three observations 
can be made. First, the statutes are rather broad in this respect 
because the merchant must not only be protected from liability 
for his own conduct but from vicarious liability arising out of the 
conduct of his employees.88 Second, legislatures have sought to 
avoid judicial limitations based on the nature of employment by 
leaving out all references to specific types of employees. Third, 
the privilege is usually given to a broad class of persons, in accord 
with a policy of granting the privilege to persons most likely to 
witness circumstances creating a suspicion of shoplifting. The 
most common formulation is that the privilege extends to "any 
peace officer, merchant or merchant's employee."89 Some states 
do not extend the privilege of detention to peace officers, often 
adding merchant's "agents" to the list.90 The use of the term 
doctrine includes detention in the immediate vicinity of the merchant's premises as well 
as detention on the premises. TORTS REsTATEMENT SECOND, Tentative Draft No. I, §120A, 
caveat (1957). 
87 Ohio has made this limitation less severe where the store is of a self-service type. In 
such a case, the suspect may be detained after he passes the check-out counter. The re-
quirement is clearly meant to assure that the person detained intends to convert the goods. 
In this connection it should be noted that Ohio has not enacted a new criminal provision 
covering shoplifting. 
88 See, e.g., Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 50 S.E. (2d) 387 (1948); 
comment, 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 82 at 92-98 (1952). Cf. Szymanski v. Great Atlantic &: 
Pacific Tea Co., 79 Ohio App. 407, 74 N.E. (2d) 205 (1947) (store liable for conduct of 
employees of independent contractor hired as. store detectives); Combs v. Kobacker Stores, 
(Ohio App. 1953) 114 N.E. (2d) 447 (store liable for conduct of a fellow partner). The 
merchant defendant may escape liability by showing that his agent or employee acted 
outside the scope of his authority. E.g., Rigby v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 160 Wis. 228, 151 
N.W. 260 (1915); Rogers v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 48 Wash. (2d) 879, 297 P. (2d) 250 
(1956). See, generally, 35 A.L.R. 645 (1925) and 77 A.L.R. 927 (1932). 
so Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. The Utah statute is similar, adding the term 
"agent." The Arizona statute, discussed in text at note 107 infra, extends its privilege to 
this same group. The Louisiana statute refers to "specifically authorized employees," 
thereby raising the question whether this is to be interpreted to mean specifically author-
ized to exercise the privilege at any time, or specifically authorized with regard to the 
particular detention. 
90 Merchant or employee: Kansas, Minnesota and Ohio. Owner, operator, manager or 
employee: New Mexico. Merchant, agent or employee: Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts and 
Virginia. The Massachusetts statute provides that detention must be by agents or employ-
ees "authorized for such purpose." The Virginia statute is unique in extending the privi-
lege to attendants of parking lots owned or leased by the merchant, or operated under an 
agreement with the merchant. 
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"agent" creates some uncertainty, for an agent may occupy a posi-
tion with regard to the merchant which is totally unrelated to his 
business: e.g., a personal real estate agent. This being so, the 
term as used in this context will probably be interpreted to mean 
an agent in some way connected with the particular business, an 
interpretation which will in most instances coincide with that of 
the term "employee." 
The final major problem is the effect to be given a judicial 
determination that a person authorized to exercise the statutory 
privilege properly has done so. Three distinct approaches are 
found in the statutes. Four states simply set forth the privileged 
conduct without specifying the extent to which its exercise results 
in immunity from civil liability.91 Two others provide that no 
civil or criminal liability shall arise out of the exercise of the 
privilege.92 And the majority list the types of civil actions in 
which the privilege operates as a defense.93 Each approach has its 
weaknesses. 
Those statutes which are silent on the extent to which the 
privileged conduct operates as a defense in civil suits in a technical 
sense at least make the defense a matter of implication. This at 
once creates both an uncertainty and a flexibility in the law. A 
court could hardly hold that such a statute gave a merchant no 
defense in civil suits, for this would have the effect of making the 
concept of privileged conduct meaningless. This means the courts 
will hold either that the statute provides a defense in some types 
of action and not in others, or that the statute provides a defense 
in all actions. Because of the dangers inherent in applying a 
statutory defense in only certain types of civil actions,94 and be-
cause of the likelihood that courts will feel such classification to be 
a legislative matter, these statutes will most likely be held to supply 
a defense in all civil actions arising out of the detention of suspects. 
Thus what is said about statutes expressly providing that no 
liability shall result from the exercise of the statutory privileges is 
equally applicable to those silent on the matter. 
The statutes which provide that no liability shall result from 
the exercise of the privilege avoid the difficulty encountered by 
those which enumerate the classes of actions in which the statute 
91 Kentucky, New Mexico, Ohio and Oklahoma. 
92 Illinois and Utah. 
93 See notes 95, 96 and 99 infra. 
94 See text at notes 97 through 99 infra. 
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provides a defense, namely, the likelihood that an ingenious plain-
tiff will be able to bring his action in a form which is technically 
outside the statute but which will produce the same result. For 
example, a large number of states allowing detention of suspected 
shoplifters provide that no liability for false arrest, false imprison-
ment or unlawful detention shall be incurred thereby.95 Several 
others limit the defense to actions for false arrest and false impris-
onment. 96 These statutes are likely to be interpreted as provid-
ing no defense in actions for slander or assault and battery. Yet 
any publicly-initiated detention is likely to give rise to the ele-
ments of a slander action,97 and most detention will contain the 
elements of at least a technical assault.98 It appears, therefore, 
that these statutes prohibit the effective exercise of the privileges 
they create by failing to encompass all the classes of actions avail-
able to the wronged suspect.99 
The apparent reason for expressly extending the defense only 
to certain classes of actions is a fear that the removal of all liability 
will leave the wronged individual completely remediless. But 
while this fear is to be respected, the extension of the defense to 
some actions and not to others is not the best way to meet the 
problem. The proper balance between the rights of the wronged 
suspect and the merchant is best arrived at by making the statutory 
privilege a bar to the recovery of exemplary and punitive damages, 
as well as damages for mental anguish, and not to the recovery of 
actual out-of-pocket losses.100 Such a rule allows the recovery of 
actual losses in all cases, rather than the recovery of overall damages 
in some cases and none in others. 
(2) Statutes Giving Merchants Privileges in Terms Other 
Than a Right To Detain. Up to this point the discussion has 
95 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. 
96 Georgia, Louisiana and Massachusetts. 
97 See, e.g., Camp v. Maddox, 93 Ga. App. 646, 92 S.E. (2d) 581 (1956); Little Stores 
v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943). 
98 See, e.g., Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, I S. (2d) 510 (1941), where the court 
found assault and battery in the defendant's act of seizing a package from the plaintiff's 
arms and tearing it open, while making accusations against the plaintiff. 
99 Four states which expressly or impliedly give the merchant a right to detain have 
sought to avoid this difficulty by making the list of actions in which the defense is available 
more comprehensive. Kansas and Oregon make the statutory privilege a defense in actions 
for slander and assault, as well as false imprisonment, false arrest and unlawful detention. 
Virginia adds malicious prosecution to this list. Mississippi is very careful to miss nothing, 
adding the phrase "or othenvise" to a very comprehensive list of types of actions. 
100 The Michigan statute takes this approach. See the discussion in the text at note 
106 infra. 
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directly concerned only statutes which in some manner give the 
merchant a privilege of detention. Brief mention should be made 
at this point of several other statutes which deal with the civil 
liability of merchants. 
Montana and Alaska have extended a very limited privilege to 
the merchant: he may only request that persons on his premises 
place or keep in full view any merchandise removed from its place 
of display or elsewhere. Both statutes provide that the proper 
exercise of the privilege shall be a defense in any type of civil 
action.101 The privilege would apparently not extend to attempts 
to detain or recover the goods, and the use of the word "request" 
indicates that no use of force is contemplated. 
The newly-enacted Texas statute on the other hand is as broad 
as the Montana and Alaska statutes are narrow, providing that all 
persons with reasonable grounds to believe the crime of shoplifting 
has been committed "have a right to prevent the consequences of 
shoplifting" by openly seizing any goods so taken and taking them, 
along with the offender if he can be taken, without delay to a 
magistrate or police officer. The statute is silent on the extent to 
which the privilege shall operate as a defense, so it will probably 
operate as a defense in any type of civil action.102 The language 
of "seizure" seems to encompass a greater degree of force than does 
recovery of goods or detention. Similarly, the absence of limita-
tions on the classes of persons who may exercise the privilege makes 
the statute broader than most. 
Two unique statutes are those of Wisconsin and Michigan. 
The Wisconsin statute is phrased in terms of the force which can 
be used by a person in order to prevent or terminate what he rea-
sonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his property. 
Any reasonable force may be used if the actor reasonably believes 
it necessary, provided that force likely to cause death or great 
bodily harm shall not be deemed reasonable. Certain classes of 
third persons, including merchant's employees or agents, are au-
thorized to exercise the privilege. These provisions may be con-
strued to permit detention for questioning, since such detention 
is a logical incident to the prevention or termination of the be-
lieved unlawful interference. Perhaps the most peculiar fact about 
the Wisconsin statute is that by its terms it provides the merchant 
101 Alaska does this by simply providing that the person properly exercising the privi-
lege shall not be "criminally or civilly liable." Montana achieves the same result by giving 
a comprehensive list of the classes of actions in which there shall be no liability. 
102 See text at note 94 supra. 
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with a defense to criminal liability only.103 However, in light of 
the policy of the statute, analogous defenses for civil actions will 
probably be recognized by the courts of that state. If so, the 
privilege is likely to be qualified by limitations similar to those 
embodied in common law doctrines of defense and recapture, 
doctrines from which the statutory privilege is an obvious out-
growth.104 
The Michigan statute takes a far different approach. It simply 
provides that in civil actions105 arising out of conduct "involving" 
a person suspected of theft of goods held for sale where the mer-
chant had reasonable ground to believe the person involved had 
committed a theft, no damages for mental anguish or exemplary 
or aggravated damages shall be allowed unless the merchant or his 
agents acted unreasonably. The measure is unique because it 
operates at the damage level rather than as a defense.106 The 
merit of this type of legislation lies in the fact that it reduces the 
financial peril for the merchant who accosts a suspected shoplifter 
while at the same time it retains some form of redress for the in-
nocent individual who can show actual damages resulting from the 
merchant's conduct. 
Finally, two states have legislatively adopted variations of the 
defense judicially formulated in Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co.107 
This is the so-called merchant protection doctrine, which simply 
provides that reasonable cause shall be a defense in false imprison-
ment actions brought by suspected shoplifters who were tem-
porarily detained for investigation by merchants. Arizona pro-
vides that reasonable cause shall be a defense in actions for false 
imprisonment, false arrest or wrongful detention against mer-
chants, their employees and peace officers by persons suspected of 
shoplifting. Washington has accorded the same defense to its 
police officers only. The statutes do extend the doctrine some-
what beyond its common law development, since it had not gen-
erally been available in actions for false arrest.108 Also, the 
statutes may be interpreted to allow detention for purposes other 
103 Wis. Stat. (1957) §939.45. 
104 These limitations are fully discussed in comment, 46 Iu.. L. REv. 887 (1952). 
105 Specifically, the statute applies to actions of false imprisonment, unlawful arrest, 
assault, battery, libel or slander. 
106 In this respect the Michigan statute closely resembles the doctrine allowing the 
use of probable cause as a device to mitigate damages. See note 26 supra. See also the 
Report of the Michigan Legislative Committee on Shoplifting, 69th Mich. Leg. (Reg. Sess. 
1958) House Journal, No. 23, p. 249. 
1015 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936). 
10s See note 28 supra. 
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than investigation, unlike the common law rule. But the statutes 
still have defects. They are so lacking in precision that they fail 
to give merchants any standard which they can effectively use to 
evaluate their own actions. And they also fail to provide defenses 
in actions for slander and assault and battery, areas where protec-
tion is needed. 
CONCLUSION 
While the statutes under discussion have not been on the 
books for a long enough period of time for any trends in inter-
pretation or determinations of effectiveness to be formulated, 
several conclusions can be drawn. First, it seems unlikely that 
any great decrease in the amount of shoplifting_ will take place in 
those states which have done no more than enact new criminal 
legislation. The apprehension of criminals will remain just as 
great a problem as before. Second, according defenses in civil 
actions to merchants who seek to apprehend shoplifters should be a 
potent weapon against shoplifting for several reasons. These 
provisions supply a means for dealing with juvenile offenders 
which may be more desirable than criminal prosecution. The 
non-professional shoplifter may be deterred by the mere fact of 
humiliation arising from apprehension by a merchant. And, 
perhaps most important, a merchant may act with some degree of 
speed when shoplifting is suspected. Third, the statutory privi-
leges are likely to receive a strict construction from courts which 
will regard them as an infringement of individual freedom. There 
is undoubtedly a very real threat to that freedom in these statutes,· 
for while it is true that theoretically the innocent person will be 
released and saved the humiliation of arrest and jailing, the fact 
remains that detention may be humiliating in itself. For this rea-
son, it seems best to provide that where the merchant exercises a 
statutory privilege, the offended person may still recover his out-
of-pocket losses, having no right to exemplary or punitive damages 
or damages for mental anguish.109 The merchant's risk is substan-
tially reduced, while some slight remedy is preserved for the in-
nocent party who is actually injured. 
Wilbur ]. Markstrom, S.Ed. 
109 To a small extent, this result is now achieved by the fact that appellate courts 
often reduce excessive punitive and exemplary damages in false imprisonment and arrest 
cases arising out of shoplifting situations. See Hammargren v. Montgomery Ward 8: Co., 
172 Kan. 484 at 502-504, 241 P. (2d) 1192 (1952). See, generally, 35 A.L.R. (2d)·273 (1954). 
1960] COMMENTS 451 
APPENDIX I 












Connecticut. . . . . . . 1959 
Florida. . . . . . . . . . . 1955 
Georgia .......... 1957, 1958 
Idaho ........... . 
Illinois ........•.. 
Indiana .......... . 
Kansas .......... . 
Kentucky ........ . 
Louisiana ........ . 
Maine .......... . 
Massachusetts ..... . 
Michigan ........ . 
Minnesota ....... . 
Mississippi ...... . 
Montana ........ . 














New Hampshire . . . 1957 
New Mexico. . . . . . 1957, 1959 
North Carolina .... 
Ohio .....••...... 
Oklahoma ....... . 
Oregon •..•.....•. 
Pennsylvania ..•.... 
Rhode Island ..... . 
South Carolina .•... 
South Dakota ..... . 




Washington ...... . 


















Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1957) tic. 14, §334 
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1958) §§20-1-5 
co 20-1-6 
Ariz. Rev. Scat. (1956; Supp. 1959) §§13-673 co 13-675 
Ark. Scat. Ann. (1947; Supp. 1959) §§41-3939 co 
11-3942 
Public Ace 596, Laws 1959 
Fla. Scat. Ann. (1914; Supp. 1958) §811.022 
Ga. Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1958) §§26-2640 co 
26-2642; Ga. Code Ann. (1956; Supp. 1958) §105-
1005 
Idaho Code (1948; Supp. 1959) §18-4626 
Ill. Rev. Scat. Ann. (1959) c. 38, §§252.1 co 252.4 
Ind. Scat. Ann. (Burns, 1956; Supp. 1959) §§10-3024 co 
10-3027 
House Bill No. 388 (1959) 
Ky. Rev. Scat. (1959) §§433.234 co 433.236 
La. Rev. Scat. (1950; Supp. 1958) tic. 15, §§84.5 co 
84.6 
Me. Rev. Scat. (1954; Supp. 1957) c. 132, §10-A 
Mass. Laws Ann. (1956; Supp. 1958) c. 231, §94-B 
Mich. Pub. Aces (1958) p. 211, Ace No. 182 
Minn. Scac. Ann. (1917; Supp. 1958) §§622-26 co 
622-27 
Miss. Code Ann. (1956; Supp. 1958) §§2374.01 co 
2374.06 
Mone. Rev. Code (1917; Supp. 1959) §§64-212 co 
64-213 
Neb. Rev. Scat. (1943; re-issue 1956; Supp. 1957) 
§§29-402.01 co 29-402.03 
N.H. Rev. Scat. Ann. (1955; Supp. 1957) §582.15 
N.M. Scat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1959) §§40-45-24 co 
40-45-27 
N.C. Gen. Scac. (1953; Supp. 1959) §14-n.1 
Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §2935.041 
Okla. Scac. (1958) tic. 22, §§1341-1342 
Laws 1959, chapter 626 
Pa. Scar. Ann. (Purdon, 1945; Supp. 1958) tic. 18, 
§4816.1 
House Bill No. 1482 (1959) 
S.C. Code (1952; Supp. 1959) §§16-359.1 co 16-359.4 
House Bill No. 620 (1959) 
Tenn. Code Ann. (1955; Supp. 1959) §§39-4235 co 
39-4236, 40-824 co 40-826 
Tex. Penal Code Ann. (Vernon, 1953; Supp. 1959) 
Arc. 1436e 
Ucah Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1959) §§77-13-30 co 
77-13-32 
Va. Code (1950; Supp. 1958) §§18-187.1 co 18-187.3 
Laws 1959, chapter 229 
W. Va. Code (1955; Supp. 1959) §§5990(8) co 5990(11) 
Wis. Scat. (1958) §939.49 
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APPENDIX II 
Aaruisr POWERS OF OFFICERS AND PRIVATE PERSONS WITHOUT A w ARRANT FOR 
M1sDl!Ml!ANORS IN A SHOPLIFTING CONTEXT* 
Powers Apart from Broadened by the 
Shoplifting Laws Laws 
State 
Private Private 
Persons Officers Officers Persons 
Alabama .................. (1) (2) §334(2) 
Alaska ...••............... (1) (2) 
Aiizona ...........•....... CL (2) §13-674 
Aikansas ...•.............. CL (2) 
California •................ (1) (2) 
Colorado .................. (1) Note 24 
Connecticut ............... CL CL 
Delaware ................. CL (3) 
Florida ................... CL (2) §811.022(2) 
Georgia ................... (1) (2) 
Hawaii ................... (1) Note 24 
Idaho .................... (1) (2) 
Illinois ................... (1) Note 24 
Indiana ................... CL (2) 
Iowa .•................... (1) Note 24 
Kansas ................... CL CL 
Kentucky ................. ·CL CL 
Louisiana ................. CL (2) §2 
Macyland ................. CL CL 
Maine .................... CL (2) 
Massachusetts .............. CL (2) 
Michigan ................. CL Note 24 
Minnesota ................ (1) (2) §622.27(2) 
M~issiJ?Pi ............... (1) (2) 
M1SSoun ........•......... CL CL 
Montana .................. (1) (2) 
Nebraska .................. Note 22 (2) §2 
Nevada ................... (1) (2) 
New Hampshice ............ CL (3) 
New Jersey ................ CL CL 
New Mexico .............. CL CL §40-45-27 
New York ................ (1) (2) 
Notth Carolina ............ CL (3) 
North Dakota ............. (1) (2) 
Ohio ..................... CL (2) §2935.041 
Oklahoma ................ (1) (2) §1342 
Oregon ................... (1) (2) 
Pennsylvania ............... CL (2) 
Rhode Island .............. CL Note 24 
South Carolina ............. (1) (2) 
South Dakota .............. (1) (2) 
Tennessee ................. (1) (2) §40-825 
Texas .................... Note 22 Note 24 
U~ah_. .............. _ ....... (1) (2) §77-13-31 
V1rgm1a .................. CL CL 
Vermont .................. CL CL 
W ashin~to~ : .............. CL CL §2 
W~ V1_rgm1a ............. CL CL §5990(11) §5990(11) 
W1SCons1n ................. CL Note24 
Wyoming ....•.......••... Note22 (2) 
• All notes referred to are in the text. The statutory citations are taken from the complete table 
in Appendix I. 
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SYMBOLS: CL-Common law rules applied. 
(!)-statutes generally allowing a private person to arrest without a warrant for any public 
offense committed or attempted in his presence. 
(2)-statutes generally allowing an officer to arrest without a warrant for any public offense 
committed or attempted in his presence. 
(3)-statutes generally allowing an officer to arrest without a warrant when he has reason• 
able ground to believe the person committed a misdemeanor in his presence. 
(I) Statutes broadening arrest powers of private persons: Ala. Code (1940) tit. 15, §158; Alaska 
Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §66•5-37; Cal. Penal Code Ann. (Deering, 1949) §837; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
(1953; Supp. 1957) §39-2-20; Ga. Code Ann. (1953) §27-211; Hawaii Rev. Laws (1955) §255-3; Idaho 
Code (1948) §19-604; IlL Rev. StaL (1959) c. 38, §657; Iowa Code (1958) §755.5; Minn. Stat. (1957) 
§629.37; Miss. Code Ann. (1956) §2470; MonL Rev. Code Ann, (1947) §94-6004; Nev. Rev. Stat. (1959) 
§171.240; 66 N.Y. Consol, Laws (McKinney, 1958) §183; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §29-0620; Okla. Stat. 
(1937) tiL 22, §202; Ore. Rev. StaL §133.310; S.C. Code (1952) §17-251 (larceny); S.D. Code (1939) 
§34.1608; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955; Supp. 1959) §40-816; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §77-13-4. 
(2) (3) Statutes broadening the arrest powers of police officers: Ala. Code (1940) tit. 15, §154; 
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §66-5-30; Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1956) §13-1403; Ark. Stat. (1947) §43-403; 
Cal. Penal Code Ann. (Deering, 1949; Supp. 1957) §836; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 11, §1906; Fla. 
StaL Ann. (1944; Supp. 1958) §901.15; Ga. Code Ann, (1953) §27-207; Idaho Code (1948) §19-603; 
Ind. StaL Ann. (Burns, 1956) §9-1024; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 15, §60; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 147, 
§4; Mass. Rev. StaL (1956) c. 276, §28; Minn. Stat. (1957) §629.34; Miss. Code Ann. (1956) §2470; 
MonL Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §94-6003; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; re-issue 1956) §29-401; Nev. Rev. Stat. 
(1959) §171,235; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §594.10; 66 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1958; Supp. 
1959) §177; N.C. Gen. StaL (1953; Supp. 1959) §15-41; N.D. Rev. Code (1943; Supp. 1957) §29-0615; 
Okla. StaL (1937) tiL 22, §196; Ore. Rev. Stat. §133.350; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §37005; 
S.C. Code (1952) §§17-251, 17-253; S.D. Code (1939) §34.1609; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) §40-803; Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) §77-13-3; Wyo. Stat. (1957) §7-12. 
APPENDIX III 
TYPES OP PROVISIONS ADOPTED BY THI! STATES IN THEIR SHOPLIFTING LEGISLATION 
Criminal Provisions Privileged Conduct 
Stale Take 
Possession Willful Alteration Changing Type of conduct privileged 
with intent conceal- of labels amount i11 
lo convert men/ container Privi'lege lo detain Other 
Alabama In order to attempt recovery of 
goods 
Alaska Request that goods 
be kept In view 
Arizona X Implied, See text 
at note 108 
Arkansas X(a) In order to recover goods 
Connecticut X(a) 
Florida In order to attempt recovery of 
goods 
Georgia X X X X See note 61 
Idaho X(c) 
Illinois In order to investigate ownership 
Indiana See note 34 
Kansas X In order to question 
Kentucky X(b) In order to attempt recovery of 
goods 
Louisiana In order to question 
Maine X(c) 
Massachusetts In order to question 
Michigan Implied. See 
at note 105 
text 
Minnesota In order to deliver suspect to 
officer 
Mississippi X(a) In order to question. 
See note 69 
When a defense 
FA,FI, UD, 
"no liability" 









FA, FI, A, B, L, S 
FA, FI, UD 






















Montana Request that goods S, FA or "otherwise" 
be kept in view 
Nebraska In order to attempt recovery of 
goods 
FA,FI, UD X 
New Hampshire X(c) 
New Mexico X In order to attempt recovery or 
deliver suspect to officer 
Statute sllen t X 
North Carolina X(c) 
Ohio In order to cause arrest Statute silent X 
Oklahoma In order to attempt recovery of Statute silent X 
goods 
Oregon X X See note 61 FA, FI, UD, A, B, S 
Pennsylvania X(a) In order to recover goods FA,FI, UD 
Rhode Island X X 
South Carolina X(a) 
South Dakota X(a) See note 61 FA,FI, UD 
Tennessee X(a) In order to attempt recovery of 
goods 
FA,FI, UD X 
Texas See note 33 X X Seizure of goods Statute silent 
Utah In order to Investigate and at- "no liability" X 
tempt recovery of goods 
Virginia X In order to cause arrest, See FA, FI, UD, MP, 
note 65 S,A,B 
Washington X Implied. See 
at note 108 
text FA,FI, UD X 
West Virginia X(b) X X X X 
Wisconsin Defend from Inter- See note 103 
ference with property 
(a) Statutes providing that willful concealment of goods creates a prlma facle presumption of Intent to convert, and that a finding of goods upon the person or among the belong-
ings of the suspect is prlma facle evidence of willful concealment. 
(b) Statutes providing that willful concealment of goods creates a prlma facle presumption of Intent to convert. 
(c) Statutes providing that the finding of goods upon the person or among the belongings of the suspect Is prlma facie evidence of wlllful concealment. 
ABBREVIATIONS: FI-false Imprisonment; FA-false arrest; UD-unlawful detention; A-assault; B-battery; 8-slander; D-defamation; MP-malicious prosecution. 
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